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Procedure
INTRODUCTION
When analyzing the constitutionality of a statute that may result in
an expansion of federal power, those on the bench who favor less federal
regulation have sometimes highlighted the important role of the states as
"laboratories."' One of the greatest virtues of federalism, the analogy
goes, is that "'a single courageous [sitate may, if its citizens choose, serve
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country."'2 The social and economic innovation
among the states which federalism promotes is particularly evident in
the area of criminal procedure. This diversity is, to a great extent, due to
the peculiarities of each state. The law of criminal procedure takes
shape according to the state's level of administrative resources, the size
of the local population, the degree to which issues of criminal law are
visible to the public, and the degree of political response to public
opinion on various issues.
Of course, state-level experimentation must always yield to federal
statutory and Constitutional commands. Indeed, the United States
1. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 600 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 42 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,
311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
3. See JEROLD H. ISRAEL ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITUTION 2-3
(Thomas Reuters 2010) (1989). The authors identify four factors that promote the
diversity of criminal procedure: (1) uniformity among the states in this area of law is not
required to prevent an adverse effect on interstate commerce or the "free flow of goods";
(2) the "criminal justice process must be shaped in light of the state's administrative
environment" as well as the local population and resources; (3) criminal procedure tends
to involve "issues of high visibility, and, often, high emotional content, leading to
lawmaking decisions" that reflect the local constituency; (4) "the integrated character of
the criminal justice [process] means that a divergence between states in their law
governing one part of the process most likely will necessitate further differences at other
stages of the process." Id.
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Constitution - particularly the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments - is the unifying force of criminal law among the states. A
recent Supreme Court case illustrating this interplay between state level
experimentation and constitutional uniformity is Rothgery v. Gillespie
County.' In Rothgery, the Court attempted to clarify an area of
constitutional criminal procedure that has received varied treatment in
state criminal courts: the point at which a criminal defendant's Sixth
Amendment5 right to counsel "attaches."6 In Rothgery, the Court held
that "a criminal defendant's initial appearance before a judicial officer,
where he learns of the charge against him and his liberty is subject to
restriction, marks the start of adversarial judicial proceedings that trigger
attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel."' According to the
Court, it simply reaffirmed prior case law' and reiterated the belief that
"the constitutional significance of judicial proceedings cannot be allowed
to founder on the vagaries of state criminal law, lest the attachment rule
be rendered utterly 'vague and unpredictable." 9
Despite the Court's efforts in Rothgery to shore up a "bright-line
rule" for attachment based upon prior case law,o the contours of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel are still somewhat obscure. To
understand the impact of the Court's holding, each state will need to
4. Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 212-13 (2008).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
6. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 198 ("The Sixth Amendment right of the 'accused' to
assistance of counsel in 'all criminal prosecutions' is limited by its terms: 'it does not
attach until a prosecution is commenced."' (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171,
175 (1991))).
7. Id. at 213.
8. Id. at 199 ("[Wle have twice held that the right to counsel attaches at the initial
appearance before a judicial officer." (citing Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629 n.3
(1986); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399 (1977))).
9. Id. at 199 n.9 (quoting Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 175 (2008)).
10. In United States v. Morriss, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals refers to Rothgery
as establishing a "bright-line rule" which "unambiguously reaffirmed" that the initial
appearance before a judicial officer "marks the start of adversary judicial proceedings that
trigger the attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel." 531 F.3d 591, 594 (8th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 213). Morriss sought to suppress statements
voluntarily made to an investigator on the basis that his right to counsel had attached,
and therefore he could not be questioned without presence of counsel. Id. at 593.
Because the defendant was still under investigation and had not yet made a court
appearance at the time the statements were made, the court did not have to consider
whether a particular part of the process constituted "'the initiation of adversary judicial
criminal proceedings,"' only that that no proceedings had yet occurred. Id. at 593-94
(quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)).
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assess its criminal procedure and identify how to reconcile the Court's
holding with current practices. This Comment identifies two areas of
North Carolina criminal procedure that have been impacted by the
Court's holding in Rothgery: (1) the expanded scope of a defendant's
protection under the Sixth Amendment during police questioning under
Rothgery; and (2) Rothgery's impact on attachment of the right to counsel
in light of the arresting officer's discretion to cite the arrestee rather than
perform a full custodial arrest. This Comment will discuss: the
disconnect between the rule enunciated in Rothgery and current North
Carolina criminal procedure; the impact of Rothgery on current
practices, specifically police interrogation of defendants without the
presence of counsel and the practice of misdemeanor citation and
custodial arrest; and finally, recommendations for streamlining North
Carolina criminal procedure to comply with the Court's holding in
Rothgery.
I. FROM THE FIRST APPEARANCE TO THE INITIAL APPEARANCE: EARLIER
ATTACHMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER ROTHGERY
On July 15, 2002, Walter Rothgery, who had never been convicted
of a felony, was mistakenly arrested for possession of a firearm by a felon
based on an erroneously recorded warrant." After his arrest, Rothgery
was brought before a magistrate "without unnecessary delay" 2 for an
article 15.17 hearing, as required by Texas law." The article 15-17
hearing was the first post-arrest procedure and the point at which a
magistrate reviewed the existence of probable cause for Rothgery's arrest,
informed Rothgery of the "accusation against him" and of his right to
counsel, and set conditions for pre-trial release." Rothgery was released
after posting bond and promising to appear for subsequent
proceedings.' 5 However, Rothgery was rearrested in January of 2003 on
11. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 195.
12. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 14.06(a) (Supp. 2010) (requiring that "the person
making the arrest or the person having custody of the person arrested shall take the
person arrested or have him taken without unnecessary delay, but not later than 48
hours after the person is arrested, before the magistrate" who "shall immediately perform
the duties described in Article 15.17 of this Code").
13. Id. art. 15.17. The Court in Rothgery notes that the Texas article 15.17 hearing
"combines the Fourth Amendment's required probable-cause determination with the
setting of bail, and is the point at which the arrestee is formally apprised of the
accusation against him." 554 U.S. at 195.
14. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 195.
15. Id. at 196.
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an indictment charging him with possession of a firearm by a felon and,
unable to post bond, he remained in jail for three weeks. 16 Six months
after Rothgery's initial appearance, and after several requests by
Rothgery," counsel was appointed.' 8 The indictment was eventually
dismissed after counsel presented documentation confirming that
Rothgery had never been convicted of a felony." Rothgery then brought
an action against Gillespie County based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.0 The
district court granted summary judgment for the county, 2' and the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.2 ' The Supreme Court granted
certiorari, 2  and ultimately vacated the lower court judgment and
remanded the case.
On appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the
petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated by the
county's unwritten procedure of delaying attachment of the right to
counsel until "relevant prosecutors" were aware of the defendant's arrest
or appearance before a magistrate." The Court rejected the
prosecutorial awareness standard of attachment as arbitrary, having "the
practical effect of resting attachment on such absurd distinctions as the
day of the month an arrest is made . . . or 'the sophistication, or lack
thereof, of a jurisdiction's computer intake system."' 26  Rather, "what
counts as a commitment to prosecute is an issue of federal law
unaffected by allocations of power among state officials under a State's
law."2 1 With the apparent goal of uniformly establishing the point of
attachment among the states,28 the Court held that the Sixth Amendment
16. Id.
17. See id. (noting that Rothgery requested counsel at the article 15.17 hearing and
made "several oral and written requests for appointed counsel, which went unheeded").
18. Id.
19. Id. at 197.
20. See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 413 F. Supp. 2d 806 (W.D. Tex. 2006).
21. Id. at 807.
22. See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 491 F.3d 293, 294 (5th Cir. 2007).
23. Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 552 U.S. 1061, 1061 (2007).
24. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 198.
25. Id. at 197. The county argued that criminal proceedings had not commenced for
attachment purposes due to the fact that there was 'no indication that the officer who
filed the probable cause affidavit at Rothgery's appearance had any power to commit the
state to prosecute without the knowledge or involvement of a prosecutor."' Id. at 197-98
(quoting Rothgery, 491 F.3d at 297).
26. Id. at 206 (quoting Brief for Brennan Center of Justice et al. as Amici Curiae 11).
27. Id. at 207.
28. See supra text accompanying note 9.
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right to counsel attached at the defendant's initial appearance before a
judicial officer.29
The Court's language strongly suggests an attempt to create a
bright-line rule applicable in every state criminal court.30 In fact,
Rothgery has been cited by the Eighth Circuit as having established a
"bright-line rule ... requiring appearance before a judicial officer" before
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches.3 ' However, the Court's
failure to use consistent language throughout its opinion creates some
confusion that may prevent state courts from applying the Rothgery
holding as a bright-line rule. The confusion results from the fact that
the different terms that the Court uses to refer to the proceeding at
which the right to counsel attaches, while intending to refer to a single
moment in the criminal process, may, in light of a particular state's
procedure, refer to two separate and distinctly different moments in the
criminal process.
According to the Court, its decisions in Brewer v. Williams33 and
Michigan v. Jackson" controlled its holding in Rothgery. The Court
wrote, "This Court has held that the right to counsel guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment applies at the first appearance before a judicial officer at
which a defendant is told of the formal accusation against him and
restrictions are imposed on his liberty."3 6 The Court continued, "As the
Court of Appeals recognized . . . we have twice held that the right to
counsel attaches at the initial appearance before a judicial officer."3 In
each instance, the Court cited Brewer and Jackson as the cases in which
it so held.
29. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 213.
30. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
31. United States v. Morriss, 531 F.3d 591, 594 (8th Cir. 2008) ("Morriss argues, in
effect, that we should abandon the bright-line rule the Court unambiguously reaffirmed
in Rothgery requiring appearance before a judicial officer and adopt a more flexible
approach based upon a case-by-case examination of the prosecutors' and/or investigators'
actions.").
32. These terms commonly include initial appearance, first appearance, preliminary
arraignment, arraignment on the complaint, and initial arraignment. Each of these terms
can be used to refer to a defendant's first time before a judicial officer.
33. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
34. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), overruled by Montejo v. Louisiana,
129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009).
35. See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 199 (2008).
36. Id. at 194 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 199 (emphasis added).
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The Court also cited a third case, McNeil v. Wisconsin,3 as an
example of its "latest look at the significance of the initial appearance" as
the point of attachment.39  The Court stated, "In McNeil, the State had
conceded that the right to counsel attached at the first appearance before
a county court commissioner, who set bail and scheduled a preliminary
examination."o The Court in McNeil ultimately reaffirmed "that '[tihe
Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the first formal proceeding
against an accused,' and observed that 'in most States, at least with
respect to serious offenses, free counsel is made available at that time.""
In North Carolina, the terms "initial appearance" and "first
appearance" refer to two distinct procedures in the criminal process,
each of which are codified in sections 15A-511 42 and 15A-601" of the
North Carolina General Statutes, respectively. Under North Carolina
law, an arresting officer must, "without unnecessary delay," take an
arrestee before a magistrate who must inform the defendant of the
charge against him, his right to communicate with counsel and friends,"
and the conditions of pretrial release. 5 Furthermore, if the arrest was
made without a warrant, the magistrate must determine whether
probable cause for the arrest exists.46 The "first appearance," on the
other hand, is conducted by a district court judge and must occur within
96 hours of the defendant's arrest if the defendant is not released from
custody after the initial appearance before a magistrate .4  At the "first
appearance," the defendant is given his warning against self-
incrimination 8 and the sufficiency of the charge is reviewed. 9 In
addition, the defendant is informed of his right to counsel and, if the
38. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
39. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 203 (emphasis added).
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Id. (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S. at 180-81) (emphasis added).
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-511 (2010). The title of this provision is: "Initial
appearance." Id.
43. Id. § 15A-601. The title of this provision is: "First appearance before a district
court judge; right in felony and other cases in original jurisdiction of superior court;
consolidation of first appearance before magistrate and before district court judge; first
appearance before clerk of superior court; use of two-way audio and video transmission."
Id.
44. Id. § 15A-501.
45. Id.
46. Id. § 15A-511(c)(1).
47. Id. § 15A-601(c).
48. Id. § 15A-602.
49. Id. § 15A-604.
482
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defendant requests counsel, a determination is made whether the
defendant is indigent, thus qualifying for court-appointed counsel."
The fact that the Court in Rothgery uses the terms "initial
appearance" and "first appearance" interchangeably when referring to the
point of attachment presents an issue specific to North Carolina law:
whether the point of attachment established by Rothgery corresponds to
the section 15A-511 initial appearance" or the section 15A-601 first
appearance 52 before a district court judge. The answer lies in the Court's
description of what constitutes an "initial" or "first" appearance.
Regardless of the term the Court uses to refer to the point of attachment,
it clearly describes this point in the criminal process as having two
distinct characteristics: (1) it is, chronologically speaking, the
defendant's first encounter with a judicial officer, and (2) it is the point
at which a judicial officer informs the defendant of "the formal
accusation"" against him. The second characteristic further raises the
issue of what constitutes a "formal accusation"" against a defendant. In
Rothgery, the Court rejects any distinction between a formal complaint
filed by a prosecutor and an "arresting officer's formal accusation" in the
form of an affidavit." Rather, "[wihat counts is that the complaint filed
with the magistrate accused Rothgery of committing a particular crime
and prompted the judicial officer to take legal action in response (here,
to set the terms of bail and order the defendant locked up)."56
50. Id. § 15A-603.
51. Id. § 15A-511.
52. Id. § 15A-601.
53. Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 199 (2008) ("Rothgery was taken
before a magistrate, informed of the formal accusation against him, and sent to jail until
he posted bail." (emphasis added)); see also id. at 202 ("lBjy the time a defendant is
brought before a judicial officer, is informed of a formally lodged accusation, and has
restrictions imposed on his liberty in aid of the prosecution, the State's relationship with
the defendant has become solidly adversarial." (emphasis added)).
54. See id. at 223-24 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the original meaning of
"criminal prosecution" for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
requires the filing of formal charges because "It]he affidavit of probable cause clearly was
not the type of formal accusation Blackstone identified with the commencement of a
criminal 'prosecution').
55. Id. at 199 n.9 ("The Court of Appeals did not resolve whether the arresting
officer's formal accusation would count as a 'formal complaint' under Texas state law.
But it rightly acknowledged (albeit in considering the separate question whether the
complaint was a 'formal charge') that the constitutional significance of judicial
proceedings cannot be allowed to founder on the vagaries of state criminal law, lest the
attachment rule be rendered utterly 'vague and unpredictable."' (internal citations
omitted)).
56. Id.
2011] 483
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The Court's description in Rothgery of the point of attachment
corresponds to North Carolina's section 15A-511 initial appearance
before a magistrate. This procedure constitutes, chronologically
speaking, the first-in-time appearance of the defendant before a judicial
officer17 and also the point at which the defendant is informed of "the
charges against him."5  Like the Texas article 15.17 hearing, the North
Carolina section 15A-511 initial appearance marks the point of
attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, "with the
consequent state obligation to appoint counsel within a reasonable time
once a request for assistance is made.""
II. Two AREAS OF IMPACT: THE EFFECT OF AN EARLIER ATTACHMENT
RULE ON NORTH CAROLINA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Contrary to Rothgery's attachment rule, the current state of the law
in North Carolina is that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches
at a defendant's first appearance before a district court judge pursuant to
section 15A-601 of the North Carolina General Statutes.6 o This first
appearance is neither the first-in-time appearance before a judicial
officer nor the point at which the defendant is informed of the charge
against him.6' Rather, it is the section 15A-511 initial appearance that
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-501 ("Upon the arrest of a person, with or without a
warrant, but not necessarily in the order hereinafter listed, a law-enforcement officer ...
[miust, with respect to any person arrested without a warrant and, for purpose of setting
bail, with respect to any person arrested upon a warrant or order for arrest, take the
person arrested before a judicial official without unnecessary delay.").
58. Under section 15A-511(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes, the magistrate
must "inform the defendant of: [tihe charges against him; [hlis right to communicate
with counsel and friends; and [t]he general circumstances under which he may secure
release under the provisions of Article 26, Bail." Id. § 15A-511(b). The defendant's right
to communicate with counsel at this stage, it should be noted, simply constitutes the
right to use the telephone to contact family, friends, and counsel who may assist him
with pretrial release. See State v. Haas, 505 S.E.2d 311, 311 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
59. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 198.
60. See State v. Gibbs, 436 S.E.2d 321, 345 (N.C. 1993) ("Although the first
appearance itself is not a critical stage of criminal judicial proceedings at which a
defendant is entitled to counsel . . . we conclude defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel attached during his first appearance on 4 June, when the State's position against
him solidified as to the murder charges and counsel was appointed."); accord State v.
Nations, 354 S.E.2d 510, 514 (N.C. 1987) ("Applying these principles to the present
case, it is clear that defendant's right to counsel attached at his first appearance before a
judge of the district court, on 27 September 1985, at which time counsel was appointed
to represent him.").
61. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
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constitutes a "criminal defendant's initial appearance before a judicial
officer, where he learns the charge against him and his liberty is subject
to restriction."62 Thus, the section 15A-511 initial appearance, not the
section 15A-601 first appearance, "marks the start of adversary judicial
proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel" under Rothgery.63
The attachment rule established by Rothgery impacts North
Carolina criminal procedure in two ways: (1) the scope of a criminal
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to have the presence of counsel
during police questioning and interrogation is expanded under Rothgery;
and (2) the rule established by Rothgery means that the only thing
precluding the attachment of the right to counsel for some misdemeanor
arrestees is the arresting officer's discretion to issue the defendant a
citation rather than perform a full custodial arrest, after which an initial
appearance would be made and the right to counsel would attach.
A. The Right to Presence of Counsel during Post-Attachment Police
Interrogation: The Impact of Rothgery on the Admissibility of Police
Investigation and Interrogation
Under current North Carolina law, a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel attaches at the defendant's first appearance pursuant to
section 15A-601 6 1 of the North Carolina General Statutes and "applies at
and after any pretrial proceeding that is determined to constitute a
critical stage in the proceedings against the defendant."65 However, the
first appearance itself is not a critical stage at which the defendant is
entitled to the presence of counsel.66 A custodial interrogation67 of the
62. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 213.
63. Id.
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-601 (2010); see also supra notes 42-50 and accompanying
text.
65. Gibbs, 436 S.E.2d at 345 (quoting State v. Detter, 260 S.E.2d 567, 579-82 (N.C.
1979)).
66. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-601(a) ("This first appearance before a district court judge
is not a critical stage of the proceedings against the defendant."); see also Gibbs, 436
S.E.2d at 345 ( '[T]he [first] appearance [pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-601) before a
district court judge is not a critical stage because it is not an adversarial judicial
proceeding where rights and defenses are preserved or lost or a plea taken."" (quoting
Detter, 260 S.E.2d at 582)).
67. See State v. Haddock, 190 S.E.2d 208, 212 (N.C. 1972) ("By custodial
interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. . . ." (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966))).
2011] 485
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defendant, on the other hand, is considered a "critical stage" entitling a
defendant to the presence of counsel under the Fifth Amendment.68
Additionally, once the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, the
police may not "deliberately elicit" statements from the defendant
without the presence of counsel, or without a valid waiver of the right to
counsel. 69  Furthermore, the Sixth Amendment's protection is both
broader and narrower than the Fifth Amendment's in that its application
is not limited to custodial interrogations; however, the Sixth
Amendment's protection applies only once a criminal prosecution has
commenced. 0  In the words of the Supreme Court, "The Sixth
Amendment guarantees the accused, at least after the initiation of formal
charges, the right to rely on counsel as a 'medium' between him and the
State."n
Whether an attempt by law enforcement to initiate interrogation
has occurred before or after the attachment of the right to counsel has
been the subject of several United States Supreme Court and North
Carolina Supreme Court cases.72 The significance of this issue concerns
68. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-451(b)(1) (enumerating "critical stages" at which
entitlement to services of counsel exists); see also State v. Doss, 183 S.E.2d 671, 677
(N.C. 1971) ("The in-custody interrogation was a critical stage in the proceeding, at
which time the defendant was entitled to counsel under G.S. [§1 7A-451(b)(1).").
69. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964); see also Gibbs, 436 S.E.2d
at 345 ("'[Tlhe police may not question a defendant [whose Sixth Amendment right to
counsel has attached], absent a valid waiver, without the presence and assistance of
counsel."' (quoting Detter, 260 S.E.2d at 580)); see also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,
401 (1977) ("Rather, the clear rule of Massiah is that once adversary proceedings have
commenced against an individual, he has a right to legal representation when the
government interrogates him. It thus requires no wooden or technical application of the
Massiah doctrine to conclude that Williams was entitled to the assistance of counsel
guaranteed to him by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments."). It should be noted that
the Fifth Amendment protection and the Sixth Amendment protection overlap. The
Fifth Amendment continues to apply once the Sixth Amendment attaches, but is limited
to "custodial interrogations." The Sixth Amendment protection is not limited to
custodial interrogations, but applies any time law enforcement officers attempt to
deliberately elicit statements from a defendant without the presence of counsel.
70. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
71. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985).
72. See generally Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), overruled by Montejo v.
Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Gibbs, 436
S.E.2d 321; Detter, 260 S.E.2d 567. Under Jackson, once a defendant requested counsel
under the Sixth Amendment at a preliminary hearing, police officers could not approach
the defendant to initiate questioning without the presence of counsel. Jackson, 475 U.S.
at 636. Thus, a defendant's waiver and voluntary statement given during a non-custodial
interrogation would nonetheless be invalid if the police initiated the interrogation
without presence of counsel. Since Montejo, police can approach a defendant whose
486
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the admissibility of the statement(s) into evidence in a criminal trial.
Where the police attempt to elicit statements from a defendant
subsequent to attachment of the right to counsel, and absent a valid
waiver of the right to the presence of counsel, the statements of the
defendant are potentially inadmissible at trial under the exclusionary
rule.7 ' Therefore, identifying the point of attachment in relation to the
purported attempt to elicit incriminating statements is critical in
determining whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right has been
violated, thereby triggering the exclusionary rule.
The most recent North Carolina case addressing the issue of
attachment within the context of police interrogation and questioning is
State v. Gibbs, involving a defendant sentenced to death for three counts
of first-degree murder. In Gibbs, the defendant moved to suppress
incriminating statements that he made in the course of two interviews
with police, citing the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States
Constitution, as well as article 1, sections 19 and 23 of the North
Carolina Constitution as bases for a violation of his rights." The court
proceeded to analyze the defendant's contention by examining whether
the defendant's right to counsel had attached when the statements were
made. 6  The court's analysis in Gibbs rested on a previous case
addressing a similar issue, State v. Detter, in which the court held that
once the right to counsel attaches, "police may not question a defendant,
absent a valid waiver, without the presence and assistance of counsel."7
Therefore, in analyzing the defendant's protection under the Sixth
Amendment, the relevant issue was whether, at the time of questioning,
Gibbs' right to counsel had attached.7 ' The court held that the
defendant's right to counsel attached at his first appearance on June 4,
1990 pursuant to section 15A-601." Therefore, since the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached and seek a waiver of the right to counsel.
See Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2089-91. If the waiver is valid, subsequent statements will not
be inadmissible on the basis that police approached the defendant and initiated
interrogation. See id.
73. See generally Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (excluding post-
indictment statements surreptitiously elicited by the government and without presence
of counsel); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (excluding a post-indictment
confession of the defendant made while being questioned in the jailhouse, without
presence of counsel).
74. Gibbs, 436 S.E.2d 321.
75. Id. at 344.
76. Id. at 344-46.
77. Detter, 260 S.E.2d at 580.
78. Gibbs, 436 S.E.2d at 345-46.
79. Id.
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right to counsel had not yet attached at the time that the police
interviews occurred, there was no constitutional violation and the
defendant's statements were not inadmissible under the Sixth
Amendment.80
However, if the case had occurred after Rothgery, the result surely
would have been different. In Gibbs, the defendant's section 15A-511
initial appearance occurred on the morning of May 31, 1990.81 The
defendant's incriminating statements, which were the subject of the
court's decision, were made during interviews that had occurred on May
30, 1990, around 8:00 pm on May 31, 1990, and on June 3, 1990." The
defendant's initial appearance was conducted "[sloon after 6:32 pm" on
May 31. Finally, the defendant's first appearance pursuant to section
15A-601 occurred on June 4, at which point his right to counsel was
deemed to have attached." Applying the Court's holding in Rothgery, it
seems that the defendant's right to counsel would have attached at the
initial appearance on the evening of May 31 and any subsequent
statement deliberately elicited by police85 without the presence of
counsel and without a valid waiver would have been subject to
exclusion. 8 Gibbs initially confessed to the murders during an
80. Id.
81. See id. at 343-46. According to the court, Gibbs voluntarily arrived at the police
department on May 31, 1990 and was interviewed by the police. Id. at 332. Later that
day, the defendant was "taken to the magistrate's office, where arrest warrants were
served on him, and then returned to the police department." Id. at 343. The court does
not specifically name this proceeding, but later in its opinion, the court references the
May 31 appearance before the magistrate in calculating the 96-hour time period after the
section 15A-511 initial appearance within which a defendant must be brought before a
district court judge for his first appearance pursuant to section 15A-601. The court
stated, "In the instant case the record shows defendant made his first appearance on 4
June 1990, within ninety-six hours of 31 May, when he was taken into custody." Id. at
345. The May 31 appearance before the magistrate was the section 15A-511 initial
appearance before a magistrate.
82. Id. at 332, 343-45.
83. Id. at 343.
84. Id. at 345.
85. According to Kuhlmann v. Wilson, police "deliberately elicit" a statement from a
defendant when the police engage in some sort of "action, beyond merely listening ...
designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks." 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986).
86. See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008). Ultimately, Gibbs'
statements were admissible because the Fifth Amendment did not apply to exclude the
statements. Gibbs, 436 S.E.2d at 347. The court held that, although Gibbs was in
custody and had requested counsel, an "interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda
had not occurred and therefore the statements were not excluded under the Fifth
Amendment. Id. However, had the Sixth Amendment been deemed to have attached,
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interview at 1:40 pm on May 31, before the initial appearance was
conducted that evening.87 However, during Gibbs' subsequent interview
at 8:00 pm on May 31, he "described his movements on the night of the
murder in great detail," including the acquisition of a weapon for the
purposes of going to the victims' house that night.8 Furthermore,
during the June 3 interview, Gibbs admitted that he made his girlfriend,
Yvette Gay, come with him on the night of the murder and "made her
stand watch."' Ultimately, Gibbs was convicted of three counts of first-
degree murder under theories of premeditation and deliberation and
felony murder." Yvette Gay was convicted for three counts of first-
degree murder under the same theories in a separate prceeding.9 The
exclusion of Gibbs' statements would likely have affected the weight of
the state's evidence against both Gibbs and Gay, specifically as to the
element of premeditation and deliberation.
Gibbs illustrates the interplay between current North Carolina
procedure and the earlier attachment rule established by Rothgery with
respect to police questioning and interrogation procedures. Under the
current North Carolina practice of pinning attachment of the right to
counsel to the first appearance, as opposed to the initial appearance, the
Sixth Amendment protection for the presence of counsel during police
attempts to deliberately elicit incriminating statements occurring
between the initial appearance and first appearance is deemed
inapplicable, because the right to counsel has not yet attached." If
North Carolina law were in compliance with Rothgery, a defendant's
right to counsel would attach at the initial appearance and would entitle
the defendant to the presence of counsel, unless validly waived, during
any subsequent critical stages, including custodial interrogations93 and
Gibbs' protection under Massiah would have applied to prevent police from "deliberately
eliciting" statements from Gibbs without presence of counsel, or without a valid waiver
of the right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment would have added an additional layer of
protection, beyond the Fifth Amendment protection during custodial interrogation,
which would require police to seek an intelligent and voluntary waiver from Gibbs
before attempting to deliberately elicit statements from him.
87. Gibbs, 436 S.E.2d at 332.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 332-33.
90. Id. at 334.
91. See North Carolina v. Gay, 434 S.E.2d 840, 843 (N.C. 1993).
92. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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non-custodial police interviews14 that occur in the intervening period
between the initial appearance and first appearance.
B. Police Discretion and Attachment of the Right to Counsel: The Impact of
Rothgery on Misdemeanor Arrest and Citation Procedures95
In North Carolina, a law enforcement officer who has probable
cause to believe a person has committed a misdemeanor offense in his
presence may issue a citation ordering the suspect to appear in court 96
or, under certain circumstances," perform a custodial arrest." Should
the officer choose the latter option, he must transport the suspect for
initial appearance before a magistrate to determine whether probable
cause exists, and, if so, the magistrate must inform the defendant of the
charge against him, his right to communicate with counsel and friends,
and the conditions of pretrial release.99
94. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
95. Even though Rothgery dealt with a felony offense, the Court does not explicitly
limit its holding to felony offenses to the exclusion of misdemeanor offenses. In a
subsequent Texas Court of Appeals case, Williamson County v. Heckman, No. 03-06-
00600-CV, 2010 WL 1632901 (Tex. App. Apr. 23, 2010), which was filed before the
decision in Rothgery, several petitioners charged with various misdemeanor offenses
attempted to bring a class action based on an alleged "systematic and deliberate scheme"
by judges and magistrates in Williamson County, Texas. Id. at *1. The petitioner's
contended that judicial officials engaged in the scheme to "deprive persons accused of
misdemeanor offenses in Williamson County of their right to be represented by counsel
and of their right to obtain court-appointed counsel when they are financially unable to
hire a lawyer." Id. The court ultimately held that the petitioners' individual claims were
moot, and therefore they did not have standing to pursue a claim on behalf of a class. Id.
at * 13. In establishing the claims were moot, the court noted that Williamson county, in
response to "intervening changes in the law" including the decision in Rothgery,
"amended their magistrate procedures to ensure the provision of additional information
and assistance to accused persons regarding their right to counsel and refined their
procedures for ensuring prompt appointment of counsel when a request is made." Id. at
*1l. One policy adopted by the county included the distribution of a document titled
"Information About Your Right to a Court-Appointed Attorney" informing the defendant
how to obtain counsel and "requiring the magistrate to 'ensure that reasonable assistance
in completing the necessary forms for requesting appointment of counsel is provided to
the person."' Id. at *11 n.15.
96. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-302(c) (2010). The citation must identify the crime
charged, the name and address of the person cited, the officer issuing the citation, as well
as an order to appear in a designated court on a certain date and time. Id.
97. See id. § 15A-401(b) (detailing when an arresting officer can make a warrantless
arrest for a misdemeanor); see also ROBERT L. FARB, ARREST, SEARCH, AND INVESTIGATION IN
NORTH CAROLINA 35-36 (3d ed. 2003).
98. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401.
99. See id. § 15A-511(b); see also supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
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As many as forty-six states have adopted citation procedures as a
means of reducing the cost of processing and detaining suspects,
reducing the amount of time an officer spends arresting and transporting
suspects, and allowing the officer to remain in his or her patrol district
to respond to other criminal activity.'oo Whether an officer decides to
perform a custodial arrest, rather than issue a citation, may depend on a
variety of factors, including, but not limited to: the type of offense, the
suspect's behavior, verification of the suspect's address within the
jurisdiction, or the suspect's failure to provide proper identification.o
Allowing the officer to use such discretion has not been without
controversy. For example, in a five to four decision, the Supreme Court
affirmed a Fifth Circuit judgment upholding an officer's decision to
make a custodial arrest of a woman for driving without her seatbelt and
for failing to secure her children in seat belts.' 2 In a dissenting opinion
in the case below, Fifth Circuit Judge Reynaldo Garza argued that the
officer had probable cause to stop the vehicle, but "should have given
[the driver] a citation to appear instead of seizing her, putting handcuffs
behind her back, and taking her to the police station."0 3 The strongly
worded dissent of Judge Garza highlights the controversy surrounding
an officer's exercise of discretion to perform a custodial arrest in light of
the impact of such an arrest on the individual.
While controversy surrounding a police officer's discretion to make
a warrantless custodial arrest typically involves the Fourth Amendment
right against unreasonable search and seizure,04 such discretionary
decision-making may now have additional controversial implications
with respect to the Sixth Amendment in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Rothgery. The earlier attachment rule established by
Rothgery means that the only thing precluding the attachment of the
right to counsel for some misdemeanor arrestees is the officer's
discretion to cite the arrestee rather than perform a full custodial arrest,
after which an initial appearance would, "without unnecessary delay,""'
100. Warren Davis, Should Georgia Change Its Misdemeanor Arrest Laws to Authorize
Issuing More Field Citations?: Can an Alternative Arrest Process Help Alleviate Georgia'sJail
Overcrowding and Reduce the Time Arresting Officers Expend Processing Nontraffic
Misdemeanor Offenses?, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 313,315 (2005).
101. Id. at 318.
102. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 195 F.3d 242, 244 (5th Cir. 1999), affd, 532
U.S. 318 (2001).
103. Atwater, 195 F.3d at 247 (Garza, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
104. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
105. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-501(2) (2010) (requiring that a person arrested
without a warrant be brought "before a judicial official without unnecessary delay"); see
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be conducted and the right to counsel would attach. An officer's
discretion on this issue will, at least under North Carolina law,
determine whether the "initiation of adversary judicial proceedings"
occurs shortly after the event that gave rise to the offense, a condition
precedent to attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel under
Rothgery.106 Whether this result is considered to be significant or merely
a procedural quirk of no importance depends upon one's understanding
of the purpose and scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Rothgery provides two bases for arguing that an officer's discretion
on this matter should not determine the attachment of a defendant's
constitutional right to assistance of counsel: (1) the Court's rejection of
the prosecutorial awareness standard for attachment,'07 which is
underscored by the Court's broader rejection of arbitrariness and lack of
uniformity as related to attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel; and (2) the Court's recognition of the defendant's need to
obtain counsel in order to prepare a defense and avoid trial altogether.'o
To illustrate an officer's discretion to cite or arrest for a
misdemeanor offense, consider the following hypothetical: A police
officer is assigned to patrol the area around a large stadium during a
sporting event. Shortly after beginning his patrol, the officer notices a
group of people congregating around two young men who are shouting
obscenities and approaching each other as if to engage in a physical
fight. Friends of the young men attempt to restrain the two as the officer
approaches. Rather than make a custodial arrest for disorderly conduct,
a misdemeanor under section 14-288.4 of the North Carolina General
Statutes,"o' the officer decides to issue a citation. After all, the officer has
just begun his patrol and spending an hour transporting the suspects for
booking would detract from the time that he needs to spend patrolling
the event. Hours later, as people are leaving the event, the officer
happens upon a similar scene. Having reached the end of his shift, and
on his way back to the station, the officer chooses to arrest and transport
the suspects back to the station for booking and initial appearance.
Two hypothetical groups of suspects "apprehended" for the same
offense of disorderly conduct, yet, according to the Supreme Court's
also id. § 15A-511(a)(1) ("A law-enforcement officer making an arrest with or without a
warrant must take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before a magistrate as
provided in G.S. 15A-50 1.").
106. See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008).
107. See id. at 206-07.
108. See id. at 209-10.
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.4.
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decision in Rothgery, the second group may be entitled to appointed
counsel shortly after the event under the Sixth Amendment"o whereas
the first group of suspects may not be similarly entitled.'" In Rothgery,
the Supreme Court established that a defendant's initial appearance
before a magistrate, irrespective of prosecutorial involvement, "marks the
start of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.""' The Court rejected the
prosecutorial awareness standard for attachment proffered by the
respondent, which required that "relevant prosecutors" be aware of the
particular arrest or initial appearance before the right attached." 3 The
Court held that such a system for measuring the point of attachment was
arbitrary, having "the practical effect of resting attachment on such
absurd distinctions as the day of the month an arrest is made . . . or 'the
sophistication, or lack thereof, of a jurisdiction's computer intake
system.""' 4 Subjecting the Sixth Amendment right to the vicissitudes of
a jurisdiction's administrative system or a prosecutor's awareness of
judicial proceedings at a particular moment is, according to the Court,
impermissible." 5 Rather, "what counts as a commitment to prosecute is
an issue of federal law unaffected by allocations of power among state
officials under a State's law."" 6
As illustrated above, the Court's decision to uniformly establish the
point of attachment at the initial appearance before a judicial officer was
motivated by the Court's general disdain for the various and seemingly
arbitrary factors influencing the attachment of the right to counsel.-"
The Court's rejection was supported by its emphasis on the significance
of the commencement of a criminal prosecution,"" at which point the
right to counsel attaches."' Reiterating its previous decision in Kirby v.
110. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 213.
111. Section 15A-501 of the North Carolina General Statutes provides that the initial
appearance for a warrantless arrest must be conducted "without unnecessary delay."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-501.
112. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 213.
113. Id. at 197-98.
114. Id. at 206-07 (quoting Brief for Brennan Center of Justice et al. as Amici Curiae
11).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 207.
117. Id. at 206-07.
118. See id. at 198 ("The Sixth Amendment right of the 'accused' to assistance of
counsel in 'all criminal prosecutions' is limited by its terms: 'it does not attach until a
prosecution is commenced."' (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991))).
119. Id. at 213.
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Illinois, the Court repeated that "[tihe rule is not 'mere formalism,' but a
recognition of the point at which 'the government has committed itself
to prosecute."120 Whether by "'formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information, or arraignment,""" the initiation of criminal
judicial proceedings marks the moment the defendant "'finds himself
faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in
the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law.""22 Whether
the state has objectively committed itself to fully prosecuting the
defendant is irrelevant;2 3 rather, what matters is that the defendant is
"brought before a judicial officer, is informed of a formally lodged
accusation, and ... the [sitate's relationship with the defendant has
become solidly adversarial.""'
This "adversarial position" vis-A-vis the state in which the defendant
now finds himself is not merely theoretical, but has practical
implications as well. The Court notes that "a defendant subject to
accusation after initial appearance is headed for trial and needs to get a
lawyer working, whether to attempt to avoid that trial or to be ready with a
defense when the trial date arrives."'25 The majority's recognition of this
point suggests a broader interpretation of the purpose and scope of the
right to counsel beyond the traditional "critical stage" analysis requiring
assistance of counsel only at "certain pretrial events [that] may so
prejudice the outcome of the defendant's prosecution." 2 6 Rather, the
Court's language suggests that appointed counsel's role includes efforts,
shortly after appointment, to investigate the charge and begin
formulating a defense.12 7 The benefits of a broader interpretation of the
scope of appointed counsel's role are illustrated by the facts in Rothgery:
factual investigation by Rothgery's attorney shortly after appointment
revealed the deficiency of the charge against Rothgery, which led to
dismissal of the charge.' 8 While factual investigation in the early stages
may not uncover such significant deficiencies, investigation by counsel
shortly after the events giving rise to the charge is especially important
for identifying and contacting witnesses whose memories may diminish,
120. Id. at 198 (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)).
121. Id. (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984)).
122. Id. at 198 (quoting Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689).
123. See id. at 202.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 210 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 217 (Alito, J., concurring); see also Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L. REV. 306, 315
(2008).
127. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 217.
128. See id. at 196-97.
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as well as locating other physical evidence vulnerable to destruction,
which may be necessary for a defense at trial.
Prior to Rothgery, both the Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit
recognized the importance of assistance of counsel during periods of
time close to the point of attachment, but which do not formally
constitute a critical stage.' For example, in Mitchell v. Mason, the Sixth
Circuit held that a defendant convicted of second-degree murder was
denied effective assistance of counsel due to the absence of counsel
throughout the pre-trial period, a period that the court described as
"critical" because "it encompasses counsel's constitutionally imposed
duty to investigate the case."1 o Most notably, the Supreme Court in
Powell v. Alabama recognized the importance of representation during
the pre-trial period as "perhaps the most critical period of the
proceedings . . . that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until
the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thorough-going
investigation and preparation were vitally important."'' In a more
recent case, the Supreme Court, commenting on the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, provided that "[tihe core of this right has historically
been, and remains today, 'the opportunity for a defendant to consult
with an attorney and to have him investigate the case and prepare a
defense for trial.""32
As one legal commentator points out, the longer a defendant goes
without assistance of counsel after being charged with an offense, "the
odds of successfully challenging the state's evidence shift more decidedly
against the defendant." Mounting a successful defense requires
prompt investigation and identification of witnesses who, as more time
passes, are more likely to be unavailable or unwilling to cooperate. 3 1
Furthermore, "[tihe delay in representation damages the attorney-client
relationship and makes it more difficult for the client to trust his
lawyer's assessment to exercise his trial rights."'35 Finally, the earlier the
representation, the sooner an attorney can review the charging
document for any weaknesses or errors and so "prevent an unlawful or
129. See generally Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841 (2009); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932); Mitchell v. Mason, 325 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2003).
130. Mitchell, 325 F.3d at 743.
131. Powell, 287 U.S. at 57.
132. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. at 1844-45 (citing Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 348
(1990)).
133. Douglas L. Colbert, Thirty-Five Years After Gideon: The Illusory Right to Counsel
at Bail Proceedings, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 17 (1998).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 19.
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unjust prosecution. "'13 This last point is precisely the type of error that
could have been detected by an attorney in Rothgery's case early on,
rather than six months after the initial appearance and after Rothgery
had been jailed twice.131 A simple review of Rothgery's criminal history
by his appointed attorney would have revealed that he was never
convicted of a felony, and therefore could not be charged with
possession of a firearm by a felon.3 3 For a defendant in North Carolina
charged on a citation with a misdemeanor, the date on which the
citation directs them to appear is typically the day on which the case will
be tried, affording them virtually no real opportunity to be appointed
counsel prior to trial. As a result, many North Carolina defendants are
deprived of the benefits associated with an earlier attachment rule,
including the ability to identify key witnesses, preserve vulnerable
evidence, and establish a meaningful attorney-client relationship in
advance of trial.
In Rothgery, the Court's repudiation of arbitrariness with respect to
the point of attachment, coupled with its recognition that the right to
assistance of counsel includes the need to prepare a defense and to
attempt to avoid trial altogether, strongly calls into question any
legitimate basis for allowing an officer's discretion to determine the
attachment of the constitutional right to counsel for misdemeanor
offenders. If it is arbitrary to rest attachment on the awareness of a
particular prosecutor, it is likewise arbitrary to rest attachment on an
arresting officer's discretion to cite or perform a custodial arrest.139
Coupled with the practical importance of assistance of counsel to
prepare a defense or negotiate a plea,' there is no meaningful basis to
preclude attachment for one defendant charged with a particular
misdemeanor offense, but not another defendant charged with the same
offense simply because the individual officer involved chose to perform a
custodial arrest, rather than issue a citation.
III. CONCLUSION
In Rothgery, the Court creates a bright-line rule that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches at a defendant's first-in-time
appearance before a judicial officer where the defendant is informed of
136. Id. at 20.
137. See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 196-97 (2008).
138. Id.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 96-103.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 125-27.
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the charge against him.14' In North Carolina, the point of attachment
established by Rothgery corresponds to a defendant's initial appearance
pursuant to section 15A-511'12 of the North Carolina General Statutes,
not the section 15A-601 first appearance"' as is currently the law in
North Carolina."' The Court's decision to uniformly establish an earlier
attachment rule is motivated by its repudiation of the seemingly
arbitrary factors that affect attachment of the right to counsel, as well as
the Court's recognition that assistance of counsel is necessary at an
earlier stage in order for a defendant to prepare a defense and potentially
avoid trial altogether."'
Compliance with the Supreme Court's holding in Rothgery will
require North Carolina to amend sections of chapter 15A of the North
Carolina General Statutes, specifically sections 15A-511, 15A-601 and
15A-603." 6 The current procedure of informing the defendant of the
right to counsel and determining indigency is detailed under section
15A-603 and conducted at the section 15A-601 first appearance. This
procedure ought to be removed from section 15A-601 and transposed to
the section 15A-511 initial appearance procedure. As the law currently
stands, the magistrate must, at the initial appearance, inform the
defendant of his right to communicate with counsel and friends, but this
right is limited simply to use of a telephone to contact those who may
assist him with pretrial release."'4  This part of section 15A-511 should
be expanded to include the indigency inquiry and determination
outlined in section 15A-603. Upon informing the defendant of his right
to communicate with counsel, the magistrate should inquire whether the
defendant is able to obtain counsel and inform the defendant that he will
be provided counsel if he is determined to be indigent, as detailed under
section 15A-603. These changes to chapter 15A will bring North
Carolina law in to compliance with Rothgery and will avoid confusion as
to the defendant's right to presence of counsel during subsequent
attempts by police to elicit statements from the defendant. In so doing,
North Carolina will minimize potential future motions for suppression
of evidence filed on the premise that a defendant was deprived assistance
141. Rothgery, 154 U.S. at 213.
142. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-511 (2010).
143. Id. § 15A-601.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 42-59.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 125-27.
146. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-603(b) ("The judge must inform the defendant of his right
to be represented by counsel and that he will be furnished counsel if he is indigent.").
147. Id. § 15A-511(b)(2); see also State v. Haas, 505 S.E.2d 311 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
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of counsel during police interrogations conducted after the defendant's
right to counsel was deemed to have attached under Rothgery.
As to the matter of misdemeanor citation and custodial arrest
procedures: A majority of states have wisely adopted procedures that
allow law enforcement officials to use discretion when deciding to
physically arrest a defendant that the officer has probable cause to
believe has committed a misdemeanor offense.1 4 Rather than make a
physical arrest, the officer who simply issues a citation helps reduce the
judicial cost of arresting, transporting, and processing each suspect, and,
furthermore, helps to increase local safety by maintaining a more
consistent presence in the community. 4 9
However, judicial economy is not the only interest implicated by
the officer's decision to issue a citation. Under Rothgery, the officer's
decision to issue a citation, a decision that may depend on a variety of
factors, can effectively prevent the triggering of attachment of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel soon after the event that gives rise to the
offense.' The misdemeanor defendant who never appears before a
magistrate will not be informed of his right to counsel,' if at all, until
his court appearance and will thus be deprived of the right to counsel in
the intervening period. The benefits of the right to counsel in this
period are, according to the majority in Rothgery, significant and include
the ability of the defendant to prepare a defense and to attempt to
potentially avoid trial altogether.5 5 Also of critical importance is the
right to have counsel present when questioned by police. Absent the
appearance before a magistrate, a defendant currently has no mechanism
to request that counsel be appointed to represent him or her in
defending against the charge, while the prosecution may be busily
preparing a case.
State legislatures that have adopted discretionary arrest procedures
should ensure that the interest of judicial economy promoted by
misdemeanor citation and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for
defendants who, but for the officer's discretion, would have made an
initial appearance, are both preserved. In North Carolina, officers who
148. See Warren Davis, Should Georgia Change Its Misdemeanor Arrest Laws to
Authorize Issuing More Field Citations?: Can an Alternative Arrest Process Help Alleviate
Georgia's Jail Overcrowding and Reduce the Time Arresting Officers Expend Processing
Nontraffic Misdemeanor Offenses?, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 313,315-16 (2005).
149. Id.
150. See Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 213.
151. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-511(b).
152. See Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 210.
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choose to issue a citation to a misdemeanor offender should, along with
the citation, provide a document with instructions that the person
charged may appear in court, request an attorney, and have his
indigency status determined. The document could be similar in form to
the one adopted by Williamson County in Texas, a county that amended
its policies in response to Rothgery to ensure that misdemeanor
defendants are informed about their right to counsel." 3
Similar to the "disposition court" already in existence in Wake
County, North Carolina,'5 4 each county should establish a particular day
and time during which individuals cited with a misdemeanor could
appear to request counsel and fill out the paperwork necessary for an
indigency determination. For counties that provide appointed counsel
from a rotating list of attorneys or on an ad hoc basis, the name and
contact information of the appointed attorney can be provided to the
defendant immediately following the indigency determination. Where a
more formal system of indigent defense services exist, such as a public
defender's office, the court can forward the defendant's information to
the public defender and provide the indigent defendant with contact
information for the public defender's office.
Together, amending sections 15A-511, 15A-601, and 15A-603, and
reforming the misdemeanor citation procedure, would bring North
Carolina in line with Rothgery and would ensure that the discretion of
the arresting officer - a valuable tool in reducing judicial costs - does
not separate a misdemeanor defendant from the right to counsel to
which he would otherwise be entitled had the officer decided to perform
a custodial arrest. Furthermore, these changes will promote the
constitutional uniformity sought to be achieved by the Court in Rothgery
and will guarantee that attachment of the right to counsel is not reduced
to a "mere formalism" subject to the various factors of a particular
criminal administrative system.'"' In the words of the Court, the point
of attachment is "the point at which. . . 'the adverse positions of
government and defendant have solidified,' and the accused 'finds
153. See supra note 95. The document provided to defendants is titled "Information
About Your Right to a Court-Appointed Attorney" and includes details about how and
when a defendant can obtain an appointed attorney. Williamson County v. Heckman,
No. 03-06-00600-CV, 2010 WL 1632901, at *11 n.15 (Tex. App. Apr. 23, 2010).
154. See Wake County Clerk of Court, Criminal Division: Disposition Court,
http://web.co. wake.nc.us/courts/disposition.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2010). The
disposition court allows people cited with traffic violations to come to the courthouse
any time between 7:45 am and 3:30 pm to pay off their citations without having to wait
in the courthouse for several hours. Id.
155. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 198 (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)).
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himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society."'15 ' The
attachment rule established by Rothgery is based largely on the Court's
recognition of the significance of the adversarial relationship between
the state and the defendant, as well as the practical reality that "a
defendant subject to accusation after initial appearance is headed for trial
and needs to get a lawyer working, whether to attempt to avoid that trial
or to be ready with a defense when the trial date arrives.""' In light of
the Court's explication of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and its
admonition of the seemingly arbitrary factors affecting its attachment,
Rothgery makes clear that this is one area of constitutional criminal
procedure foreclosed from further experimentation and variation among
the states.
Rebecca Yoder
156. Id.
157. Id. at 210.
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